TUP SECRET DAUNT

Approved For Release 2000/08/23 62S00231A000100130014-5

Chief, Industrial Div.

5 November 1959

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Chief, Aircraft Branch, D/I

Comments on -- Comments on NIE 11-8-59, 14 October 1959

1. Page 1, paragraph 1 and 2.

The writer's discussion of bomber and missile production raises the following question:

"Are the Russians willing to forego production of both bombers and tested ICRM's, and rely almost entirely upon a Badger force for an extended period for deterrence, to musit a possible future development in solid fuels?"

I/AR estimate is that the USSR would produce the tested ICBM at least for an interim period until something better was available, otherwise their strategic posture would be vulnerable for an extended period.

- 2. Reference to comment of paragraph 4 (page 6, line 1 of NIE). Agreed that change from "an adaptation" to "a direct copy" is the correct statement.
- 3. Reference to comment of paragraph 5e and b (Page 7, paragraph 9 of HIE). I/AR has never felt that the USER lead times were especially short, therefore we suggest deletion of the HIE sentence --

"Their short lead times were indicative of a high priority effort".

I don't think this statement would necessarily be true even if their lead times were short. In the following sentence in the NIE, it is stated that:

"Moreover, the Bear entered ----, the Bison in a smaller plant which ---."

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TOP SECRET DAUNT

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SUBJECT: Comments on -- Comments on NIE-11-8-59, 14 October 1959

Plant No. 23 is not smaller than Flant No. 18 -- in fact it is larger. In the last sentence of page 7, paragraph 9 of the NIE it is stated that:

"--- fluctuating production rates, and by at least three complete cossations --

The "by at least three" statement should be changed to "by at least two". I/AR agrees that modifications were not frequent, however, production rates have fluctuated and there have been at least two cessations of production as follows:

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in 1958 was probably caused by construction of the BOUNDER prototype(s).

4. Reference to comment of paragraph 6 (page 8, paragraph 10 of MIE). I/AR agrees that the Bison program was not bungled but probably proceeded much slower than the Soviets expected, however, the slowness of the program may have come about because of a change of mind by the Soviets as to the overall value to Russia of a heavy bomber program. The statements in paragraph 29 (NIE) do not seem to I/AR to be in any way inconsistent with other portions of the paper. It seems only common sense that the USSR would maintain their current bomber force until other weapons are available.

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SUBJECT: Comments on -- Comments on NIE 11-8-59, 14 October 1959

- 5. Reference to comment of paragraph 7 (page 16, paragraph 26, HIE). I/AR sees no reason to add the word "principal". It is evident that Soviet authorities do not intend to produce more Badger, Bear, Bison aircraft. "Minimal" seems to be an excellent word to describe Rison production, because if production goes lower it will be zero.
- 6. Paragraph 8. No comment. (I/AR agrees with Section III of MIE).
- 7. Comment 9 (page 24, paragraph 40 of HIE). No comment. Will 1/3 to 2/3 of SAC be sirborne?
 - 8. Comment 10 (page 34, paragraph 56 of NIE). No comment.
- 9. Comment 11 (page 35 paragraph 57 of HIE). Operating at about 1/3 of Flant No. 23 only. There are several other plants which could be made available for "capacity".
 - 10. Balance of paper No comments.

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Attachment

Bison vs US B-52 Development

MISSING PAGE

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

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